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Chapter pages in book: (p. 326 - 331)POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INVENTORY INVESTMENT
Since inventories may be liquidatedas well as accumulated, it
might be thought that there isa qualitative difference betweena
change in the rate at which theygrow and at which they decline.
From the viewpoint of the impactupon production and employ.
ment, a reduction in the rate at which inventoryis accumulated
has the same effectas an acceleration in the rate at whichinven-
tory is liquidated. A reduction in therate at which inventory is
liquidated has thesame effect on production as an increase inthe
rate at which it is accumulated.
These facts will be quicklyappreciated by consideringan hypo..
thetical illustration of totaloutput or gross nationalproduct dur-
ing several periods (Table 6o).Let us suppose that thepart of
total output in each periodthat takes the form ofgoods sold to
consumers or to business firms to addto their plant and equipment
remains constant. Changes in totaloutput can then be chargeden-
tirely to changes in therate at which goods are addedto inventory.
TABLE 6o
Sales, Stocks, and TotalOutput
Hypothetical Illustration
If we think of increasesin the rate of investmentand decreases
in the rate of disinvestmentas changes in thesame direction, it is
immediatelyapparent that each has exactlythe same effectupon
production, provided theyare of the same size. Thus betweenper- iods 2 and3 the rate of investmentgrows from +10 to +20;pro-
duction increases by thesame amount, from1,010 to i ,020. In the
same way the rate of disinvestmentof inventories declinesbetween periods7 and 8 from2O to 10; productionincreases by the same amount, from 980to gao. Throughoutthe table the change
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in production equals the changein the rate of investment in in-
ventory. Evidently from the viewpointof their effects on produc-
tion, there is no qualitative difference betweeninvestment and dis-
investment,1 and a cycle that runs from a peak of inventory accu-
mulation to a peak of inventory disinvestment (trough of accumu-
lation) back to a peak of accumulation is a continuous whole.
The relations between production and stock illustrated in Table
6o are true without qualification only for the economy as awhole.
If we consider one sectormanufacturing industries, for example,
or some singleindustrythen obviously among goods held in
stock some will have been purchased from other sectors. To say that
in this situation an addition to stock requires production inthe
same quantity involves a tacitassumption that there is no com-
pensating reduction of stock elsewhere. Of course, special circum-
stances aside, this assumption, that other thingsremain equal, is
necessary and valid for analytical purposes.
PLANNED VS. UNPLANNED INVENTORY INVESTMENT
Goods added to stock must have been producedbarring offset-
ting reductions in stock elsewhere; and the desire to add goods to
stock stimulates businessmen to produce or purchase more goods.
Thus the demand for goods for inventory investment is part of the
total demand for goods. The converse, however, need not be true.
The goods added to stock may not have been made in response to
a desire to invest in inventory.
This well known paradox is easily resolved. Unless a manufac-
turer, for example, produces exclusively to order, he mustbase his
decisions about the quantity of goods to purchase and to produce
in large part on a guess about the quantity he will sell. If his guess
is wrong, he has various alternatives. If he has overestimated de-
mand, he may add more goods to stock than he had planned. Or
by reducing prices or offering other inducements to customers, or
by advertising, he may achieve his anticipated rate of sales. But
price reductions may not stimulate sales sufficiently. Competitors
1 Strictly speaking, this is true only as long as production is some positive quan-
thy. If production is zero, as may sometimes happen in small sectors of the
economy, there may be disinvestment in stocks at a changing ratewithout af-
fecting the (zero) rate of output. But stocks cannot, of course, accumulate
when production is zero.F
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may meet his prices, which will lessen the efficacy ofa cut of any
given size, and his customersmay be encouraged to expect fur-
ther cuts, which may cause them to curtailpurchases temporazJy
In any event, the quantity of goodsa manufacturer sells duringa
given period is unlikely to be identical withthe quantity heex-
pected to sell at the beginning of the period.And since he willnot
be able immediately to makea full adjustment in his receipts of
purchased goods and in hisown rate of production, theamount
of goods he holds in stockat the end of any period is unlikelyto
be identical with the quantityhe had planned to hold. Thisdiffer-
ence between the actual stock ina businessman's possession at the
end of a period and the plannedstock represents unplannedaccu-
mulation or liquidation of inventories.
The fact that part of the inventoryinvestment of any period is
unplanned is significant intwo ways. First, if one billion dollars
of goods are added to stock duringa certain period, then, strictly
speaking, it is valid tosay only (what is tautologically true) that
output worth one billion dollars took theform of inventory invest-
ment. We cannot validly say thatproduction worth one billion dol-
lars was stimulated bya desire to add such a quantity ofgoods to
stock. For the production ofpart of these goods may have been
due to the expectationthat they would be soldor used up in the
fabrication of other goods.Similarly, the outputstimulated by the
desire to invest in inventoriesmay exceed one billion dollars if sales
were underestimated and ifmanufacturers were unwillingor un-
able to restrict salesto the quantities they hadoriginally expected.
The distinction between plannedand unplanned inventory in-
vestment is important in anotherway. An increase in the output
of goods, whatever itscause, entails a larger outlay of fundsto hire labor and to purchase theadditional goods and othersupplies re-
quired. This additional outlaystimulates purchases ofconsumer
goods and the production ofraw materials, thereby settingin train a series of secondaryconsequences that tend to increasethe total output and income of thecommunity. If the additionalproduc- tion takes the form ofunplanned accunmlatioiof inventories, however, there isan offsetting factor. Theholders of theexcess stocks are likely in futureperiods toattempt to curtail their out-
put or purchases or at leastto keep them belowthe levels at whichSIONIP1CANC OF INVENTORY INVESTMENT 333
they would otherwise have been set. Thus the secondary conse-
quences of unplanned inventory mvestment are in part depressing
to busmcss. Similarly, if stocks are reduced below planned levels
or if inventory investment tunis out to have been smaller than
businessmen desired, the secondary consequences upon orders and
output decisions in subsequent penods are likely to be expan-
sionary.
Inventory statistics are, of course, distressingly silent about the
size of planned and unplanned investments. They tell us only what
actually happened. But unplanned investments may sometimes be
very important. The amount added to stocks is always small com-
pared with total production and sales. Hence a small percentage
error in producers' expectations of sales may cause a large un-
planned investment or disinvestment in inventories, at least during
any short period. Over long periods, no doubt, such mistakes are
corrected and large unplanned holdings are eliminated from busi-
ness inventories. The unplanned portion of the inventory invest-
ment during a year is, therefore, likely to be a relatively small part
of the total annual investment. The analysis of business cycles,
however, is often concerned with events that take place within one,
two, or three months, and for such short periods unplanned invest-
ment may be a large part of the total, a fact that serves to becloud
the interpretation of the data.
2Plan of Part Three
Two major questions are studied in the succeeding chapters. The
first concerns the cyclical timing of inventory investment. Chap-
ters 14 and i 5 compare the behavior of investment by manufac-
turers as a whole with inventory investment in other industrial
divisions. They try to establish the timing of the turning points of
inventory investment relative to the turning points of business
cycles and to those in the rate of change in output. The general
conclusion is that the peaks and troughs of inventory investment
are near those of business and considerably later than those of the
rate of change in output. These observations lead to a discussion
of the influence of inventory investment in initiating business cycle
turns and in determining the pace and length of expansions and
contractions. The next four chapters, i 6-i,examine the behavior334 PART THjp
of investment in the major types ofstocks held bymanufactui
in an attempt to discover thecauses of inventory investment
cycies in this branch of theeconomy. Chapter o draws togetherthe rern.
suIts of these detailed studies.
The second major questionconcerns the relation betweenthe amplitude of cycles in inventoryinvestment and in totaloutput. In Chapter 21,we confirm the fact (noted in Ch.i) that a very large part of the total changesin gross nationalproduct during
business cycles takes the formof changes in inventoryinvestment In addition, the datastrongly suggest that the shareof inventory
investment varies inverselywith the length ofbusiness cycles. A
general explanation of theserelations is attempted.Finally weex- amine the theory,advanced by Hansen andothers, that minor
cycles, attributable toa periodic need for inventoryreadjustment regularly interrupt thecourse of major upswings inbusiness.